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Abstract
This paper evaluates the tax reforms carried out in Sweden between 1980 and 1991.  We
use a recently developed nonparametric labor supply function to account for the
behavorial responses of the taxed individuals. We decompose the tax reform to study
how the separate components influence hours of work, tax revenues and income
distribution. The results indicate that the reform was underfinanced and that the
increased indirect taxation and redesigned transfer system almost eliminated the positive
effects on hours of work due to the decreased marginal taxes on labor income. Further,
we compare the results to the predictions of a parametric estimated labor supply model.
The responses of the parametric model is almost twice the size of the nonparametric.
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1  Introduction
The Swedish tax system has during the last 15 years been transformed in several
important ways. Marginal tax rates reached a peak around 1980. However, since this
system with very high marginal tax rates was combined with a system of fairly liberal
rules for deductions of various forms, many economic agents could avoid the high
marginal taxes by using the system of deductions in a clever way.  During the eighties
there was a series of tax reforms, decreasing marginal tax rates and limiting the scope
for various forms of deductions.  The series of tax reforms culminated in 1991 with a
large change in marginal taxes between 1990 and 1991, several types of base broadening
and the introduction of separate taxation of labor and capital income.
Several motivations have been given for implementing the tax reforms. The need to
reduce the negative incentive effects of high marginal tax rates on household behavior
such as savings and labor supply is probably the single most important one. Another
motivation was a concern that the distributional effects of the old tax system were not
the ones intended. The use of deductions could in many cases lead to high income
earners paying very little in taxes.
Tax reform has been a continuous and gradual process for a long period of time. We
therefore have a choice of what part of this process to study. We have chosen to study
the effect of the tax reform that took place between 1980 and 1991. This period is of
special interest since the tax systems in these two years constitute two extremes.
Marginal tax rates reached a historical high in 1980 and a low in 1991. After 1991 there
have been some increases in the marginal tax rates. We do not cover all aspects of the
tax reform but focus on four changes of large importance for individual behavior; a
decrease in marginal tax rates, a change in the rules for capital income taxation and
deductions, an increase in the VAT and payroll taxes and a change in the transfer
system.
1
                                                
1 There has also been important changes in the corporate taxation, which is not covered in this study.2
The major purpose of our paper is to study how the tax reform has affected hours of
work,  tax revenue and the income distribution. We investigate the total effect of the tax
reform, but also perform a decomposition so we can see the effect of its various parts. A
novel feature of this study is that we use a nonparametric labor supply function to
calculate how hours of work change in response to the tax reform. This should lead to
more reliable predictions than if a parametric function was used. Since this method is
still not developed for household models we only present calculations of how hours of
work change for married or cohabiting men in ages 20-60. This group constitutes a
major part of the labor force if measured by the part of the tax base it generates.
2
When discussing the effects on the income distribution we do this for two types of
income units. First of all we do it for married or cohabiting men. Using the
nonparametric labor supply function we can study how important the labor supply
response is for the distribution of income. We also study how the distribution of
household income, corrected for the number of household members, is affected by the
tax reform. In the past such studies have usually neglected the effects that follow from
changed household behavior. We are able to partly include the induced changes in labor
supply. We take account of the change in the husbands hours of work but not of the
change in female labor supply. The transfer system was designed so as to correct for
inequalities created by the tax reform. The objective was that the combined changes in
the tax-transfer systems should be distributionally neutral. The politicians were
especially concerned that families with children should not be hurt by the reform. To get
at this latter aspect we calculate the effect on the income distribution where we account
for the fact that different households consist of different number of consumption units.
As far as we know this is the first study that uses a nonparametrically estimated
labor supply function to evaluate the effect of tax reform. A second purpose of our study
                                                
2 Aronsson and Palme (1995), using a parametric household model, study how labor supply, tax
revenues and income distribution are affected by the tax reform. Agell et.al. (1996) give a broad
picture and evaluation of the tax reform.3
is therefore to compare the predicted effects using this nonparametric method to the
results obtained using a parametrically estimated labor supply function.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a stylized
description of the Swedish tax reform. The motivation for using nonparametric methods
and a description of the parametric and nonparametric procedures used are given in
section 3. In section 4 we describe how the tax reform is decomposed and present our
calculations of the effect of the tax reform on hours of work and tax revenue. In section
5 we study the income distribution effects. Section 6 concludes.
2  Swedish tax reforms 1980-1991
To summarize the sequence of Swedish tax and transfer reforms carried out
between 1980 and 1991 we examine the main differences in the prevailing tax and
transfer systems of each separate year. We divide the personal income tax system into
three separate parts: labor income taxation, capital income taxation and real estate
taxation. Further we analyze the transfer systems and indirect taxes as separate
components of the reforms. In interest of brevity this section only includes a concised
presentation of the tax and transfer systems. There is a more extensive presentation of
the 1991 tax and transfer system in appendix A.
Personal income taxation
Merging the marginal tax rates and the rules of personal deductions the 1980 federal
tax schedule could be represented by 22 income brackets with marginal tax rates
increasing from 0 to 58%. The income brackets referred to assessed income, defined as
the sum of labor and capital income, an imputed rental income for owner occupied
homes and other sources of income, minus deductions of various sorts. Further, local
governments levied a proportional tax of about 30% on the same tax base as the federal
tax. Thus, the unconstrained top aggregate marginal tax rate equaled approximately
88%. However, to bound the marginal effects the 1980 tax system restricted the
marginal tax rate at 80% for assessed income below SEK 174,000 and 85% for higher
assessed incomes.4
In the 1991 tax system the various sources of income were taxed according to
separate rules. In particular, the federal labor income taxation was separated from capital
taxation and taxes on real estate. The federal marginal tax on labor income was reduced
to a top marginal rate of 20% for income exceeding SEK 81,175 and there was no
federal tax on lower incomes.
3 The local taxes, also levied on labor income, were
roughly unchanged and consequently the top aggregate marginal tax rate on labor was
approximately 50%. Including the rules of personal deductions, the 1991 labor income
tax schedule included 7 income brackets, with marginal tax rates increasing from 0 to
50%.
4 As mentioned above, the tax bases differ between the 1980 and 1991 tax systems,
hence straightforward comparisons of marginal tax rates on labor income should be
made with caution. Income from capital was taxed at a uniform rate of 30% in 1991. If
the tax on capital was negative, i.e. the taxed individual reported a capital deficit, the
negative amount was reduced from the overall tax liability leaving the marginal tax rates
unaffected. Hence, in contrast to the 1980 system of capital taxation, the 1991
construction practically eliminated the link between the income of capital and the
marginal tax rate on labor income. Finally, individuals who owned their homes paid a
real estate tax of 1.2% of the ratable value of the house.
5
Transfer system
The income tax reform was predicted to reduce tax payments of high income
households, thereby generating unwanted redistributional effects. In order to avoid this
the transfer system was redesigned to improve the economic conditions of households
with low income and/or many children. The child allowance, which was independent of
income, increased from SEK 2,850 per child to SEK 3,963 per child plus an additional
                                                
3 Henceforth all values are expressed in 1980 price level, using as deflator a CPI of 2.271.
4 The personal deductions cease to be income dependent practically at the same point as the federal tax
starts to be levied
5 Actually the tax rate depended on the age of the house, but since we do not have this information we
assume that all houses are older than 5 years. It should also be mentioned that the tax rate of 1.2% was
intended to increase to 1.5%. Simultaneously with the reformation of property taxation the ratable
value of the houses were adjusted. We have taken this into account by calculating the market value of
the house (ratable value in 1980 times the KSK) and then dividing the market value with the purchase
price index (köpeskillingskoefficient) for 1991.5
amount increasing with the number of children in the household. Further, the part of the
unreduced housing allowance which was dependent on family composition increased
from SEK 1,500 per year and child to a fixed amount of SEK 5,300 per year if the
household included children. On the other hand, the allowance associated with housing
costs decreased from a proportional rate of 80% of costs exceeding SEK 450 per month
to an average rate of about 65% of costs exceeding approximately SEK 600. The
allowance was then reduced depending on the household composition, income and
wealth. The construction of the reduction was not changed in the reform although the
rates and limits were redefined. However, as will be shown below, there is no doubt that
the housing allowance was substantially increased by the reform. The reformed transfer
system also allowed more households to get housing allowances.
Indirect taxation
It was indicated above that the net tax revenue for the government were
substantially reduced by the tax and transfer reforms. In order to raise the same revenue
as before the indirect taxation, such as VAT and payroll taxes, were substantially
increased. Simultaneous with a broadening of the VAT base, the VAT increased from
21.34% in 1980 to 25% in 1991, measured as percentage of net price. The base
broadening gives us reason to use an average VAT on a consumption boundle as an
approximation of the aggregate effects of the increased VAT and base broadening. The
average VAT equaled 12.8% and 16.5% in 1980 and 1991, respectively. Further, the pay
roll taxes, measured as percentage of net wage payments, increased from 35.25% to
37.47%. Although a part of the payroll tax sometimes is considered as an insurance fee
we have choosen to treat it as a proportional tax. We assume that the gross wage rate
(pre pay roll taxes) are constant thoughout all reforms and that all disposable income is
consumed.
Figure 1 illustrates the aggregate marginal effects of the income tax schedule,
transfer system and indirect taxation faced by an average individual. The solid line
represents 1980, and the dashed line corresponds to 1991. The marginal effects are
displayed on the vertical axis and the horizontal shows annual hours of work.6
Figure 1. Aggregate marginal effects of income tax schedule, transfer system, VAT
and payroll taxes 1980 and 1991 faced by an average individual
As indicated in the figure, the differences between the marginal effects at plausible
hours are not as substantial as might be expected. The aggregate marginal effect at 2,000
hours are roughly 75% in 1980 compared to 70% in 1991. However, the difference
increase as we look at higher hours of work where the effects in the 1980 system
approach 90% and the effects in 1991 stay around 70%. For moderate and low hours the
differences depends on the individual’s capital income, housing status etc.
In 1980 negative capital income was deductible from labor income, hence a capital
deficit would shift the marginal effects to the right in figure 1. However, in the 1991
system a deficit would just create a segment of zero marginal tax on labor income in the
interval where the negative tax liability of capital exceed the tax liability of the other
income sources. There will be no marginal effects from capital taxation beyond the
point where the tax liability of labor income and other sources equals the negative tax
liability of capital.
Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding budget sets to the marginal effects presented
above. The vertical axis shows the consumption (in thousands of SEK) and the
horizontal annual hours of work.7
Figure 2. Budget set generated by the income tax schedule, transfer system, VAT and
payroll taxes 1980 and 1991 faced by an average individual
The figure indicates that an average individual has higher consumption possibilities
in the 1991 than in the 1980 system. The vertical intercept of the budget set, i.e. the
nonlabor income, can be separated into three components: the net income of the spouse,
transfers to the household at zero hours of work of head and a residual non-earned after
tax income from capital and implicit rents. In 1980 the average individual received SEK
14,055 in transfers at zero hours of work, the corresponding figure for 1991 is SEK
19,327. Further, the average net income of the spouse equaled SEK 26,280 in 1980 and
SEK 30,052 in 1991. The residual net non-earned incomes equaled SEK 1,855 and SEK
803 , respectively. It now stands clear that, for an average individual, the household
transfers increased as well as the net income of the spouse.
3  Parametric versus nonparametric estimation
Parametric estimation methods impose further restrictions than those given by
economic theory. To overcome these restrictions nonparametric estimation methods
have been developed and become increasingly popular during the last decade. The
restrictions imposed by parametric methods are particularly severe when estimating
labor supply functions generated by piece wise linear budget constraints. As we will
illustrate below, this is because in the context of decision making subject to a piece wise
linear budget constraint it is hard to think of other data generating mechanisms than
utility maximization with globally convex preferences.8
Suppose hours of work, h, are generated by a linear budget constraint defined by the
wage rate w and nonlabor income y. Suppose we specify the parametric form to be
estimated as: I = a + aw + by + e, where e is a random term. Accounting for corner
solutions we define h = 0 if I < 0, h = I if 0£ £ I H  and h = H  if I > H . This model is
well defined and coherent for any values of a, a  and b. Suppose instead that the budget
constraint is piece wise linear and that we want to specify a coherent model which also
encompasses the case with just one segment. The usual way to construct a coherent
DGP when the budget constraint is piece wise linear is to assume utility maximization
with globally convex preferences. However, the assumption of globally convex
preferences implies that a > 0 and b < a / H . That is, the parametric form given above
coupled with the requirement that it should represent globally convex preferences
imposes severe constraints. Given the analytical functional forms we presently know,
the assumption of globally convex preferences severely limit the flexibility of the
functions.
Blomquist and Newey (1996) develop a nonparametric method to estimate labor
supply functions generated by nonlinear piece wise linear budget constraints. We
describe this method below. The method is based on the idea that labor supply can be
viewed as a function of the entire budget set, so that one way to account non
parametrically for a nonlinear budget set is to estimate a nonparametric regression where
the variable in the regression is the budget set. In the special case of a linear budget
constraint this estimator would be the same as nonparametric regression on wage and
nonlabor income, since these two numbers characterize the budget set. The method
would then be similar to the one used in Hausman and Newey (1995). Nonlinear budget
sets will be characterized by more numbers than two, for example for piece wise linear
budget sets by location of kink points and slopes in between. An important part of the
development of an estimation procedure is to find a way to characterize a nonlinear
budget constraint with just a few numbers.9
Estimation procedure
Suppose the budget constraint consists of three linear segments as illustrated in
figure 3. We denote the slopes of the linear segments by  wi , i = 12 3 , ,  and the intercepts
of the extended linear segments by  y i i, , , = 12 3. The slopes are the net wage rates and
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Figure 3. Three segment budget set
If hours of work are generated by a budget constraint as the one illustrated in figure
3, then expected hours of work are given by a function
E h ( *) = f w w w y y y ( , , , , . ) 1 2 3 1 2 3 . That is, there are 6 regressors in this nonparametric
regression. The Swedish tax-transfer system from the early eighties generated budget
constraints that consisted of 27 segments. To represent such a budget constraint would
require 54 regressors. Without some simplifications to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem nonparametric estimation would be unfeasible. We use two methods to reduce
the dimensionality of the estimation problem. The first step in our estimation procedure
is to approximate the budget constraints with continuos budget constraints consisting of
three piece wise linear segments. In this way we reduce the dimensionality of the
estimation problem to a manageable size. We also use some separability assumptions to
reduce the dimensionality of the estimation problem. To approximate the budget
constraints we use an OLS procedure.
The least squares approximation method
Take a set of points  hi, i = 1,...,K.  Let C(hi) denote consumption on the true budget
constraint and  $( ) C hi  consumption on the approximating budget constraint. The criterion10
to choose the approximating budget constraint is  min  S[C(hi)-  $( ) C hi ]
2. The
approximation depends on how the hi are chosen. Our criterion for choosing the hi is
how well the approximating budget constraints can explain actual data.
Series estimator
The second step in the estimation procedure is to apply a series estimator to the
wage rates, virtual incomes and kink points of the approximating budget constraints. It
should be noted that the kink points can be written as simple nonlinear functions of the
wage rates and virtual incomes, so the estimating functions are really only functions of
wage rates and virtual incomes. As criterion to choose estimating function we use a


















where  $ ( ) g i -  denotes the estimated function with observation i excluded.  The upper
bound of this measure is one. There is no lower bound.
Data source
The functions used for predicting the effect of tax reform are taken from Blomquist
and Newey (1996). Three waves of the Swedish “Level of living” survey are used for
the estimation. The data pertain to the years 1973, 1980 and 1990. The surveys were
performed in 1974, 1981 and 1991.  The 1974 and 1981 data sources are briefly
described in Blomquist (1983) and Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990)
respectively. The 1990 data is described in Blomquist and Newey (1996).
In the estimation only data for married or cohabiting men in ages 20-60 are used.
Farmers, pensioners, students, those with more than 5 weeks of sickleave, those who
were liable for military service and self employed are excluded. This leaves us with 777
observations for 1973, 864 for 1980 and 680 for 1990.
The tax systems for 1973 and 1980 are described in Blomquist (1983) and
Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990). The tax system for 1990 is described in
appendix A of Blomquist and Newey (1996). Housing allowances have over time
become increasingly important. For 1980 and 1990 we have therefore included the11
effect of housing allowances on the budget constraints. The housing allowances increase
the marginal tax rates in certain intervals and also create nonconvexities.
The fact that data from three points in time are pooled has the obvious advantage
that the number of observations increase. Another important advantage is that there is a
variation in budget sets that is not possible with data from just one point in time. The tax
systems were quite different in the three time periods which generates a large variation
in the shapes of budget sets.
Blomquist and Newey (1996) derive an exact form for expected hours of work for a
particular data generating process where the random preference variable is uniformly
distributed. In this expression for expected hours of work the following two variables
are important;   dy y y y y = - + - l l 1 1 2 2 2 3 ( ) ( ) and  dw w w w w = - + - l l 1 1 2 2 2 3 ( ) ( ). It
turns out that in actual estimation where the cross validation measure is used to chose
estimating function these two variables are important. The estimated nonparametric
function is given in table 1.
Table 1. Nonparametric estimates using pooled data
We also use a parametrically estimated function, namely the random preference
model described in, for example, Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990). To perform










wage elasticity 0.075 (6.61)
income elasticity -0.038 (-4.31)
Cross validation 0.0373
Note: t-values in parentheses. The delta method was used to
calculate the t-values for the elasticities.12
We show the results in eq. (2). t-values are given in parenthesis beneath each
coefficient.
6,7
h w y AGE NC = + - - -
- - -
- - - 1914 00157 865 10 996 10 346 10 2
6209 96 595 053 044
4 3 3 . . . * . * . * ( )
( . ) (8. ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
ln . . . . .
( . ) ( . )
L E E w y = - = = = = - 22543 0270 0105 0123 0022
4212 1181
s s h e
The wage and income elasticities are evaluated at the mean of the net wage rates
and virtual incomes from the segments where individuals observed hours of work are
located.
8 Of course, the wage and income elasticities are summary measures of how the
estimated functions predict how changes in a linear budget constraint affect hours of
work. None of the budget constraints used for the estimation are linear and we actually
never observe linear budget constraints. It is therefore of larger interest to see how the
predictions differ between the parametric and nonparametric labor supply functions for
discrete changes in nonlinear budget constraints.
4  Effects on labor supply and tax revenue
4.1  Decomposition of tax reform
The Swedish tax reform consists of many different parts. If we would like to do
further changes in the tax system it would be of value to know the effect of the various
parts of the tax reform. Which changes in the past has stimulated labor supply most.
What changes work in the opposite direction? What changes increase tax revenue?
                                                
6 The variance-covariance matrix for the estimated parameter vector is calculated as the inverse of the
Hessian of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameter vector.  We have had to
resort to numerically calculated derivatives. It is our experience that the variance-covariance matrix
obtained by numerical derivatives give less reliable results than when analytic derivatives are used.
7 Net wage rates and virtual income are expressed in the 1980 price level for all years. The wage and
income elasticities are evaluated at the average net wage rate and virtual income. The net wage rate
and virtual income being calculated for the segment where observed hours are located.
8 Ackum-Agell and Meghir (1995), using another data source and an instrumental variables estimation
technique, present wage elasticities that are quite similar to those presented here.13
What changes decrease tax revenue? As far as we know this is the first study that makes
a detailed decomposition of the tax reform.
The decomposition can be made in several different ways. One way would be to
follow the exact chronological order in which the reform has taken place. However, if
we follow this route we intertwine decreases in marginal tax rates, base broadening and
restrictions in rules for deductions. We believe this will blur the picture. Instead we have
chosen to use the following sequence.
i)  Change the marginal taxes from the 1980 to the 1991 level taking account of
changes in the personal exemption rules.
ii)  Change the value added and payroll taxes from the 1980 to the 1991 levels.
iii)  Change the capital income tax rules, including the rules for taxation of
homes.
iv)  Change the housing allowance and child allowance rules.
We calculate the effect of a reform, given the previous changes. This implies that
the picture of the effect of the various parts of the reform that we obtain depends on the
sequence in which we introduce  the various parts of the reform.
The changes in the housing and child allowance systems were designed so as to
correct for unwanted distributional effects of other changes in the tax system, so it is
natural to place this part of the reform last in the sequence. The decrease in marginal
taxes was one of the cornerstones in the tax reform and many perhaps regard this as the
quintessence of tax reform. One can regard some of the other changes in the tax system
being of interest and politically feasible only after or in combination with decreased
marginal taxes.
4.2  Labor supply effects
We will use the distribution of gross wage rates and nonlabor incomes in the 1980
data set as the basis for our calculations. For each observation in the 1980 data set we
use the gross wage rate and nonlabor income in combination with the appropriate tax
and transfer system to construct a budget set. This budget constraint is then
approximated by the least squares procedure described above. Finally we use the
nonparametrically estimated labor supply function to calculate the expected hours of14
work. Since the nonparametric function concerns expectation of  hours of work, we
need to perform the calculation one time for each observed budget set (individual),
leaving us with 864 observations. We assume that the spouse do not adjust her labor
supply due to the tax reforms, i.e. we take the gross capital and labor income of the
spouse as exogenous. However, we do allow the husband to react to the changes in the
post tax income of the spouse, i.e. we recalculate the net income of the spouse under
each separate tax regime.
Figure 4 illustrates a crude picture of the labor supply effects of the decomposed
reforms presented previously. The vertical axis displays the predicted expected hours,
the horizontal axis shows the introduced reform. Moving from left to right on the reform
axis we start with the 1980 base case, followed by the reformed marginal tax rates of
1991, then we introduce the VAT and the payroll taxes of 1991, and so on. The diamond
symbols correspond to the average predicted hours in the sample (asymptotic standard
errors of means in parenthesis)
 9, the endpoints on the vertical lines indicates the right
end points of the first and ninth decile of the observed distribution of hours. In other
words, 80% of the predicted sample is contained within the vertical lines, where the
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Figure 4. Nonparametric predictions of hours of work by decomposed reform.
                                                
9 Let b be a vector of OLS estimates, W the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the b‘s and X  a
matrix of explanatory variables (including a constant in the first column). Then the variance of the
estimated mean is e’XWX’e/N
2, where e is a vector of ones (Nx1).15
The figure indicates that, given the distribution of gross wages and nonlabor
incomes of 1980, the marginal tax reform considerably encourages labor supply,
increasing the average hours of work from 2,093 to 2,182 (roughly 4.3%). All the other
components of the reform actually reduce the average hours of work. Introducing the
raised indirect taxes cuts the average about 20 hours per year (»-1%). The reform of
capital and property taxation reduce the average about -0.4%, where the disincentive
effects are most apparent for individuals associated with high hours of work (-0.7%).
Finally, the 1991 transfer system lower the labor supply with approximately -0.7%. In
particular, the lower decile reduce their supply by approximately 25 hours per year
(more than -1%).
Considering the distribution of hours of work the dispersion increased considerably
by the aggregate reform. In our sequence of reforms the marginal tax reform and the
reconstruction of the transfer system increase the dispersion of hours. On the other hand,
the introduction of increased indirect taxes and the 1991 system of capital taxation
seems to tighten the distribution of hours. In section 5.1 we will study how the
responses to the tax reforms will affect the distribution of income.
The results from this section indicate that the marginal tax reform increase hours of
work while the other components reduce average labor supply for married/cohabiting
men. Considering the total reform the nonparametric model predicts the average labor
supply to increase about 2.1% and that the distribution of hours becomes wider.
Gross wage and labor supply effects
Above we analyzed the labor supply effects without concerns about the different
characteristics of individuals. In the remainder of this section we will study to which
extent individuals with different characteristics responds to the reforms. The first
characteristic of consideration is the level of productivity, measured here as the
exogenous gross hourly wage rate. There are several ways to analyze the incentive
effects for different levels of productivity. We could study the effects for observations
attached with different gross wage rate. In that case we would face problems to
distinguish the wage effect from other, perhaps co-varying effects. A more appealing16
alternative is to study the, so called, mongrel labor supply function (see Blomquist &
Hansson-Brusewitz 1990). This function gives the relationship between the gross wage
rate and hours of work, given the tax system and other independent variables. In figure 5
we illustrate four mongrel curves generated by an average individual facing the various
tax and transfer systems previously described. Note that the effects of the marginal tax
reform and the raised indirect taxes are combined for presentational purposes. The
vertical axis shows the post payroll wage rate and the horizontal axis shows hours of
work. The solid lines illustrate the 1980 base case and the 1991 case, respectively. The
long dashed line presents the mongrel function generated after the marginal tax rate
reform (including the VAT and payroll reforms) and the short dashed present the
mongrel function with the capital taxation of 1991 introduced.
Figure 5. The mongrel supply functions, predicted by the nonparametric model
10
First considering the mongrel function generated by the 1980 system we observe
that it is backward-bending for plausible wage rates (SEK 25 - 50), i.e. an increase in the
                                                
10  As we approximate the observed budget sets using the OLS-procedure we can only regard a discrete
number of potential kink points. This procedure generates some discontinuities in the mongrel
functions. In this figure we have smoothed the functions for presentational purposes. An alternative,
more computational demanding, procedure would be to increase the number of potential kink points.17
pre tax wage rate actually decreases the expected hours of work. It should be
emphasized that it is the tax and transfer systems that generates this shape of the
mongrel function and not the labor supply function itself.
Changing the 1980 marginal tax rates to the 1991 rates, including the increased
indirect taxation, stimulates labor supply for individuals with moderate or high wages.
For very low wages (< SEK 20) the labor supply is predicted to decrease (of course,
such low wages are rarely seen in reality). An explanation for this perhaps counter-
intuitive result could be the following: The average individual studied in figure 5 reports
a deficit in capital. For sufficiently low wage rates the individual might deduct all labor
income and as a result face a zero marginal tax rate on labor income. However, since we
include the increased indirect taxes in the marginal tax reform the individual actually
face a higher marginal tax rate with the 1991 marginal tax rates including the increased
indirect taxes compared to the 1980 base case. For more plausible wage rates the model
predicts an increase of hours of work and a strong positive relationship between gross
wage rate and hours of work. For the average wage rate in the sample (SEK 41 post
payroll) the model predicts an increase of approximately 1.6% (cf. figure 4).
Introducing the 1991 capital and real estate tax rules, which separates the labor
income from the other income sources, implies some interesting results. Recall that the
1991 construction eliminates the marginal effects on labor taxation caused by capital
deficits, except in the interval where the negative capital tax liability exceeds the tax
liability on labor income. Outside this interval the 1991 construction resembles a
positive lump sum transfer to the individual without any marginal effects on labor
income. For exceptionally low wages the interval where the marginal tax rate on labor
income is zero might extend to plausible hours of work, implying that the individual
faces a zero marginal tax rate in the 1991 tax system but a positive marginal rate under
the 1980 tax rules. This is probably the reason why the figure indicates that hours of
work increase for very low wages. However, for moderate and high wages the
reconstruction generates a reduction in hours of work. This should be expected since a
positive lump sum transfer reduce hours of work if leisure is a normal good.18
Finally, the reform of the transfer system, that significantly increases the nonlabor
income, reduces labor supply for all wage rates compared to the situation where the
1980 transfer system was prevailing (i.e. the short dashed capital income curve).
Comparing the 1980 base case and the 1991 case the nonparametric model suggests
that individuals associated with high productivity increased their annual hours of work
while less productive individuals actually reduced their hours of work.
Family composition and labor supply effects
Since the reformed transfer program was designed to improve the conditions of
households with many children, an alternative and interesting characterization is by
family composition. In figure 6 below we illustrate how the average of hours of work
vary by the number of children in the household. The solid diamonds represent the full
sample, the circles the average in households without children, the horizontal bar one



















































































































Figure 6. Nonparametric predictions of hours of work by decomposed reform and
number  of children. (Sample size: 0;330, 1;222, 2;240, 3;72)
The figure implies a remarkable relationship between the reform of the transfer
system and the spread in the distribution of hours. For the 1980 regime of transfers,
there is no divergence in hours of work between households with no or few children.
Under the 1991 transfer system, however, the dispersion is quite large - individuals
without any children works on average about 2,161 hours per year, while individuals19
with more than 2 children works about 2,095  hours. The figures also indicate that the
number of children reduces hours of work in the 1991 regime.
In order to understand the source of the dispersion of hours of work under the 1991
regime we need to take a brief look at the budget sets faced by an average individual.
Figure 7 illustrates budget sets faced by an average individual with zero and three
children, respectively. The vertical axis shows the consumption possibilities and the
horizontal axis shows hours of work.
Figure 7. 1991 budget sets for an average individual with no and 3 children.
The most striking difference between the two budget sets is the intercepts. At zero
hours of work the household with children receives almost SEK 27,000 in transfers per
year including SEK 13,870 in income independent child allowance. The household with
no children receives less then SEK 2,500 per year in housing allowance which is
reduced to zero at plausible hours. On the other hand, the reduction rate of the housing
allowance is 20% for households with children and only 10% for households without
children. Consequently the former face a higher marginal effect than the latter in the
intervals where the housing allowance is reduced. Even though there are differences in
marginal effects we might conclude that it is the child allowance that generates the
dispersion of hours of work and it should be emphasized that this dispersion is only due
to the discrepancies in the budget sets.20
4.3  Parametric predictions of labor supply
To illustrate some of the differences between parametric and nonparametric
predictions we duplicate the analysis in the introduction of section 4.2 with the
modification that we use a parametric model to predict hours of work. The parameters
are found in eq. (2). Since this is a random preference model we need to draw several
random numbers for each observation in order to calculate expected hours of wok. The
results presented in figure 8 are based on the average of 10 simulations. The vertical
axis shows predicted hours of work and the horizontal axis displays the reforms (cf.
figure 4). The end points represent the right end points of the first and ninth decile,
respectively, and the diamonds show the sample means. The crosses correspond to the













































































































































Figure 8. Parametric predictions of hours of work by decomposed reform
Comparing the predictions of the parametric and nonparametric models we
conclude that the parametric model yields almost the same qualitative effects on hours
of work although the magnitude of the variation is twice as high in the parametric
model. The percentage average increase in hours of work by introducing the 1991
marginal tax rates is approximately 7.4% compared to 4.3% predicted by the
nonparametric model. The overall percentage increase is 4.7% by the parametric model
and 2.1% by the nonparametric. Another notable difference is the distribution of hours
of work, where the nonparametric model implies a tighter distribution for expected21
hours of work. Finally, in contrast to the nonparametric model, the parametric model
predicts an increase in hours of work for the highest decile in the last reform in our
sequence, i.e. the reform of the transfer system.
4.4  The effect of tax reform on tax revenue from husbands
In this subsection we discuss the effect of tax reform on government tax revenue
from married/cohabiting men. However, since we use the transfer system with child and
housing allowances to construct the budget sets of the husbands we also include these
payments in the net tax revenue of the government. The average tax revenues from
husbands are presented in table A1. Each row corresponds to a tax system with the
reform specified in the first column introduced. The leftmost column gives the revenues
from payroll taxes. The second column presents the revenues from income taxes,
including income of capital and property. The third column presents the revenues from
VAT (based on disposable income). The gross tax revenues are presented in column
four. The fifth column shows the average transfers received by the households, where
the negative sign indicates that the transfers are paid by the government. Finally, the
rightmost column presents the average net tax revenues, i.e. post transfer payments.








1980 Base case  30244  31868   5697  67810  -3595  64214
    45     47      8    100    100    100
Marginal tax rate  31764  22747   7411  61924  -3550  58374
    51     37     12     91     99     91
Indirect taxation  32871  21826   9317  64015  -3582  60433
    51     34     15     94    100     94
Capital and property tax  32740  23261   9022  65024  -3581  61443
    50     36     14     96    100     96
Transfer system  32468  23112   9273  64854  -5676  59178
    50     36     14     96    158     92
1 The italics correspond to the percentage contribution to gross tax revenue (i.e. pre transfer payments)
2 The italics correspond to the percentage of tax revenue (transfers) of 1980
The net tax revenue column of table 2 indicates that the reform was under financed
by approximately 8%. However, there are several reasons to be careful interpreting this
result. Firstly, we account for the transfer payments to the households but we do not
include the tax payments of the spouse. Secondly, as mentioned in the introduction, we22
only consider the reform associated with taxation of physical persons, leaving out the
budget effects of the corporate taxation. Thirdly, due to lack of data we are unable to
take full account for the complete base broadening, including fringe benefits as well as
other important features, concerning capital taxation and indirect taxes. Hence, the
figure is most probably an overstatement of the true deficit generated by the aggregate
reform and should be viewed as an indication of the direction of the governmental
budget effects.
As might be expected, the marginal tax reform alone reduced tax revenues by
almost 10%, while the increased indirect taxation and change of structure of capital and
property taxation increased tax revenues generating net effects of about -4% (pre
transfer reform).
Another notable feature is the shares of contribution by income taxes versus indirect
taxes. The table indicates that the tax revenue shares corresponding to the indirect taxes
increased from 53% to 64% by the reform, i.e. the taxation shifted from income taxation
towards indirect taxation. It is also indicated in the table that the average transfer
payments to households increased substantially (about 60%) when the 1991 transfer
system was introduced. Finally, it might appear puzzling that the revenue from VAT
actually increases in the last reform as the labor supply in fact decreases, however this is
because the VAT is based on disposable income, where the increased transfers are
included.
5  Income Distribution Effects
5.1  The effect of tax reform on the distribution of husbands incomes
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the objectives of the reform was to
decrease the excess burden caused by the tax system. However, the aim was to do this
without any budget or distributional effects. In the previous section we indicated that the
reform was underfinanced by approximately 8%. This section considers the effects on
the distribution of husbands incomes. We use the Gini coefficient to measure inequality.23
In contrast to many other studies we also present standard deviations of the Gini
coefficients.
11
Table 3 presents the average gross income and other definitions of income based on
the construction of the tax system. The gross income is defined as gross earned income
(pre payroll taxes), plus capital income.
12 The others are defined as post tax incomes as
indicated in the column title. Since we assume that the gross wage is constant the
individual gross income is just a linear function of individual hours of work. Hence,
studying the gross income is approximately the same as studying hours of work,
weighted by hourly gross wage rate. However, the subsequent definitions include the
nonlinear tax system, thus generating a different distribution compared to hours of
work.
13
Table 3. Average income of husbands predicted by nonparametric model.
Reform Gross inc
1 Post Payroll




1980 Base case 103030 72786 40917 44513 38815
 100.0   70.6   39.7   43.2   37.7
Marginal tax rate 108864 77099 54352 57901 50490
 105.7   70.8   49.9   53.2   46.4
Indirect taxation 107585 74713 52887 56469 47152
 104.4   69.4   49.2   52.5   43.8
Capital and property tax 107103 74362 51101 54683 45660
 104.0   69.4   47.7   51.1   42.6
Transfer system 106105 73637 50524 56200 46927
 103.0   69.4   47.6   53.0   44.2
1 The italics correspond to the percentage of 1980 gross income
2 The italics correspond to the remaining fraction of gross income
                                                
11  Since the estimated parameters are stochastic variables, drawn from an unknown asymptotic
distribution, the observed (predicted) hours of work (and consequently the predicted incomes) are also
stochastic with an unknown asymptotic distribution. The distribution of the Gini coefficient might
perhaps be derived by ordered statistics and delta methods but due to the depth of this problem we are
satisfied by estimating the standard deviations by Monte Carlo simulations. Given the estimated
parameter vector we make 1,000 draws from the estimated parameter distribution and calculate the
Gini coefficient for each draw. From the resulting distribution we get the estimate of the standard
deviation of the Gini coefficient.
12 This definition of capital income does not include the implicit income from owner occupied homes.
13 Henceforth, gross income denote the income before any taxes (incl payroll taxes) has been paid, the
net income corresponds to the income when  all taxes (incl VAT) has been paid. Concerning the
average tax rate, the interpretation is actually the average of the proportional tax rate that generates the
same net income.24
As can be seen from the table, the average gross income increased about 3%, while
the average net income increased by more than 20%. The average tax rate decreased
from an approximate level of 62% in 1980 to 56% in 1991.
Consider two sets of Gini coefficients, one assuming that no behavorial responses
are present (i.e. individuals do not adapt to the new tax system), and the other taking the
adjustments into account. A comparison of the coefficients might give an indication if
the adjustment of hours of work increase or decrease the inequality of income
distribution. Table A3 presents the Gini coefficients based on gross and net income. The
column titled ”Fixed” refers to income calculated as if the hours of work equals hours
of work in the 1980 system and, consequently, the ”Adjusted” title refers to adjusted
labor supply.
Table 4. Gini coefficients of income of heads, static and dynamic effects predicted by
nonparametric model
Reform Gross income Net income (post VAT)
Fixed Adjusted Fixed Adjusted
1980 Base case 0.1754 0.1754 0.00221 0.1113 0.1114 0.00144
Marginal tax rate - 0.1908 0.00264 0.1495 0.1598 0.00165
Indirect taxation - 0.1893 0.00244 0.1506 0.1604 0.00157
Capital and property tax - 0.1902 0.00240 0.1536 0.1650 0.00128
Transfer system - 0.1922 0.00246 0.1440 0.1551 0.00132
Note: Monte Carlo simulated standard errors in italics. Fixed results based on 100 simulations.
The results in table 4 indicates that we might underestimate the distributional
effects if we do not take the labor supply incentive effects into account. The Gini
coefficients are higher if we take labor supply into account. It is also clear that the
reform failed to keep the income distribution unaffected; the Gini coefficient based on
net income (post VAT) increased from 0.111 to 0.155. Introducing the 1991 rules of
capital and property taxation increase the inequality. From the last row of the table we
conclude that the introduction of the 1991 transfer system increased the dispersion of
gross income, while the net income ended up being considerably more equally
distributed. Although the transfer reform reduced the inequality of husbands incomes, it
did not completely eliminate the redistributional effects from the reforms concerning the
direct and indirect taxation.25
5.2  The effect of tax reform on the distribution of equivalent incomes
An alternative to the previous analysis is to consider the distribution of incomes of
households instead of husbands. However, since the households differ in size and
composition we should take this into account by dividing the aggregate household
income by some equivalent number of consumption units. We have choosen to represent
the two adults in the household as 1.92 consumption units, reflecting the economies of
scale. Each child adds another 0.66 consumption units to the household. We then assign
the calculated equivalent income to each household member. By this procedure the
aggregate equivalent income of the households is weighted by the size of each
household. The Gini coefficient based on equivalent income are presented in table 5.
Table 5. Gini coefficients of equivalent income, static and dynamic effects predicted by
nonparametric model
Reform Gross income Net income
Fixed Adjusted Fixed Adjusted
1980 Base case 0.2514 0.2514 0.00088 0.2109 0.2109 0.00038
Marginal tax rate - 0.2566 0.00129 0.2282 0.2306 0.00076
Indirect taxation - 0.2559 0.00122 0.2284 0.2307 0.00073
Capital and property tax - 0.2563 0.00124 0.2317 0.2343 0.00074
Transfer system - 0.2602 0.00145 0.2114 0.2172 0.00090
Note: Monte Carlo simulated standard errors in italics. Fixed results based on 100 simulations.
From the analysis in section 5.1 we conclude that the reform was not
distributionally neutral.The inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, increased from
0.111 to 0.155 by the aggregate reform. However, the results in table 5 indicate that,
using  the equivalent income as the appropriate concept, the reform appears to be almost
distributionally neutral. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.211 in 1980 case to 0.217
in 1991. The marginal tax rates, indirect taxation and capital and property taxation
reforms all increase the inequality while the redesign of the transfer system considerably
reduces the inequality. We also note that the Gini coefficient of the static equivalent net
income is almost equal for the two extreme cases. This implies that if we ignore the
incentive effects we might exaggerate the redistributional effects of the reform. The
table also shows that the equivalent gross income is more unequally distributed in the
1991 system than in the 1980 system as a result of the dynamic effects.26
Finally we present the predicted gross and net income as well as the tax revenues
from the whole household, i.e. including the VAT, pay roll tax and income taxes paid by
the spouse. The results are presented in table 6.
Table 6. Average income and tax payments of households predicted by nonparametric
model
6  Summary
In this paper we use a nonparametric labor supply function to study the effect of
Swedish tax reform. We have decomposed the effect into parts. We find that the
decrease in marginal tax rates that took place between 1980 and 1991 lead to an increase
in average desired hours for married men of slightly more than  4%. The increase is
considerably larger for high wage persons than for low wage persons.  Adding the other
parts of the tax reform cumulatively we find that the increase in VAT and the payroll tax
on average decrease hours of work by around one percentage point. The change in the
capital income and property tax reduce hours of work by another half percentage point.
The change in the transfer system decreases hours of work by slightly less than one
percentage point. The net effect of the reform is therefore an increase of average hours
of work by slightly more than two percent. However, the change in hours of work differ
depending on individuals’ gross wage rates and family composition. Individuals with a
gross wage rate of SEK 55 increased their hours of work by 3.8%, whereas individuals







1980 Base case 141269 60637 80632
  100   100   100
Marginal tax rate 147103 76095 71007
  104   125    88
Indirect taxation 145194 71304 73889
  103   118    92
Capital and property tax 145341 70095 75246
  103   116    93
Transfer system 143713 70800 72913
  102   117    90
1 The italics correspond to the percentage of 1980 gross income27
hours of work by their marginal product (gross wage rate) the increase in hours of work
is therefore 1.1%. Whereas in the 1980 tax system hours of work were independent of
the number of children, in 1991 those with many children would work fewer hours than
others. This can almost exclusively be attributed to the effect of the change in the
transfer system.
According to our calculations the tax reform was under financed. In practice the
resulting deficit was financed by borrowing. This way to finance the deficit might affect
individuals labor supply. We have not attempted to account for these potential effects on
labor supply. The decrease in marginal tax rates would lead to increased hours of work,
but not by so much as to keep tax revenue neutral. Our calculations indicate that the
decrease in marginal tax rates would lower tax revenue by around 9%. However, the
increase in VAT and the payroll tax would to some extent compensate for this. The
changed rules for taxation of capital income and property also lead to increased tax
revenue. Excluding the change in the transfer system the tax reform would be close to
revenue neutral. However, the effect of the change in the transfer system is strong
leading to an overall decrease in tax revenue by around 8%. Although our calculations
might be calculated with error there is little doubt that the tax reform has contributed to
the large budget deficit in Sweden that emerged in the early nineties. The tax reform
also lead to a shift in the relative importance of tax bases. In 1980 the income tax
generated around 47% of the tax revenue from the household sector. In 1991 this had
been reduced to around 36%. The importance of the VAT and the payroll tax increased.
We study the effect on the income distribution using several definitions of the
income unit. Looking at the distribution of household income corrected for the number
of consumption units depending on a certain income we find that all parts of the tax
reform contribute to increased inequality in gross incomes. Looking at net incomes the
decrease in marginal tax rates and the change in the rules for capital income and
property seems to have contributed to increased inequality. The increase in VAT and the
payroll tax had no effect on inequality whereas the change in the transfer system
equalized net incomes leaving inequality of net income virtually unchanged by the tax28
reform. Many earlier studies have not taken the change in labor supply into account
when studying the effect on the income distribution. We find that it is important to take
these behavioral changes into account. The changes in hours of work tend to increase
the inequality of annual incomes.
We have performed our calculations using both parametric and nonparametric labor
supply functions. The parametric functions show a considerably larger change in hours.
Predictions using the parametric function indicate an increase in average hours of work
of 4.3% whereas the nonparametric indicate an increase of 2.2%. We conclude that
using parametric methods might lead to biased predictions of the effect of the tax
reform.29
Appendix A. Description of the 1991 Swedish tax and transfer system
This appendix describes how the tax and transfer system of 1991 is implemented in
the analysis. The 1980 system is described in Blomquist & Hansson-Brusewitz (1990).
If not stated otherwise the figures are relating to the 1991 price level.
Income taxes
In order to simplify the following presentation we begin with some income
definitions. The individual’s (earned) gross income is defined as the sum of the income
from different sources. The assessed income equals the gross income, minus deductions
of various sorts that are related to the earning of the income. The taxable income defines
the assessed income, minus the personal allowances. Finally, we define the  capital
income as the unearned income from interest, dividends etc., minus capital losses and
interest payments.
Income related deductions are assumed to equal the standard deduction, i.e. 10% of
earned income with a maximum deduction of 4000 SEK. The personal allowance is
somewhat more complicated. The allowance equals 10304 SEK for assessed income
below 1.86 and above 5.615 basic amounts.
1 For assessed income between 1.86 and
2.89 basic amounts the allowance escalates with 25% of the exceeding income. Finally,
for assessed income between 3.04 and 5.615 basic amounts the allowance de-escalates
with 10%. This construction creates a non-convexity in the tax schedule at 2.89 basic
amounts. Neither the standard deduction nor the personal allowance is allowed to
exceed the assessed income.
The earned and unearned incomes are taxed separately in the tax system The federal
tax for earned income is 20% for taxable income exceeding 170000 SEK and the fiscal
tax of approximately 30% was also levied on taxable income. Unearned income is taxed
at a proportional rate of 30%. If the unearned income was less than zero the taxed
                                                
1 The nominal amounts in the tax and transfer schedule are usually expressed as multiples of the basic
amount. The basic amount is updated every year to eliminate the effects of the inflation. The basic
amount equals 32’200 SEK in 1991.30
individual could claim a tax reduction equal to 30% of the deficit not exceeding 100000
SEK and 21% of the remaining. However, the tax reduction can not be larger than the
tax liability. Table A.1 summarizes the tax schedule including the standard deduction
and personal allowance in terms of marginal tax rates and the upper bounds of the
assessed income brackets
Table A.1 Marginal tax rates within income brackets.
In addition to taxes on earned and unearned incomes, owner-occupied homes are
taxed with 1.2% of the ratable value. The data set includes the 1980 guaranteed amount
calculated as a fraction of the 1980 ratable value.
2 Since the ratable value in 1991 is
significantly higher than the one in 1980 we need to account for this in our analysis.
Lacking information about the new ratable value we use the fraction between the 1980
and 1991 purchase-price coefficients to estimate the 1991 ratable value. Furthermore,
the tax rate varies with the age of the house but since we lack this information we
assume that all houses are older than 5 years.
Transfers
There are, in principle, two major transfers that affect the individuals in our sample,
namely the child allowance and the housing allowance. The child allowance is
                                                
2 The guaranteed amount is the tax base originating from owner-occupied houses, i.e. the additional
taxable income that is imposed on the taxable incomes for owner-occupied homes.











1  The marginal tax rate includes a fiscal tax of 30%
2  The intervals are deflated to the 1980 price level using a CPI of
    2.27131
independent of the household income and paid to any household with children. The
allowance includes a basic transfer of 9’000 SEK per year and child with an extra
transfer for additional children according to table A.2.
Table A.2 Extra transfers to households with many children.
In contrast to the child allowance the housing allowance dependends on the
household income and is more complex in its construction. The allowance is constructed
in two parts, one defining the maximum allowance to the household and the other
defining a reduction of the allowance. The maximum amount is based on the housing
costs, the family composition and the age of the head. Furthermore, the housing costs
for owner-occupied homes are dependent on the regional location of the house. The
relevant intervals of the housing costs are presented in table A.3.
Table A.3 Monthly housing costs brackets for households with children.
The transfer equals 75% of the costs in the lower bracket and 50% in the upper.
Households with children receives an additional transfer of 1’000 SEK per month as
housing allowance. Households without children and with heads younger than 29 years









Family composition Lower Middle Upper
One child 1’800 2’400 3’500
Two children 1’500 2’800 4’000
Three children 1’200 3’200 4’50032
In households where the head is older the corresponding monthly transfer equals 30% of
costs between 1’600 and 3’500 SEK.
When the maximum amount is calculated it is reduced if the household income
exceeds a specified level. The household income is defined as the taxable income of
both spouses, plus an additional amount equal to 20% of the household wealth
exceeding 180’000 SEK. The breakpoints and reduction rates are presented in table A.4.
Table A.4 Breakpoints in annual household income and reduction rates of housing
     allowance
Usually the reduction is based on the household income 1989 but if the 1991
household earned income is less than 1989 earned income minus 15’000 SEK or more
than 50’000 SEK above the same, the 1991 earned income (deflated by 1.13) is used
instead of the 1989 earned income.
Household composition Breakpoint Reduction rate
with children 81’000 0.20
no children, age above 28 66’000 0.10
no children, age under 29 44’000 0.3333
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